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The Clash of Agricultural Exceptionalism and the First
Amendment: A Discussion of Kansas’ Ag-Gag Law
Meredith Kaufman*
I. Introduction
A. Overview
Since the Nation’s founding, agricultural production has
been treated differently than other industries. This concept, known
as “agricultural exceptionalism,” has manifested in many different
ways throughout U.S. history. 1 Since the 1990s, one manifestation
of agricultural exceptionalism has been the enactment of “Ag-gag
laws,” state laws that limit information gathering activities at
animal production facilities.2 Ag-gag laws are frequently criticized
by animal welfare advocates and legal scholars for seeking to shield

* Author received her J.D. from the University of Colorado Law School in 2018
and received her LL.M in Agriculture and Food Law from the University of
Arkansas School of Law in May 2019. She is grateful for Professor Susan
Schneider's assistance editing this article.
1
For example, the agriculture industry is exempted from federal labor laws,
environmental regulations, and antitrust restrictions. See Susan Schneider, A
reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law of Food, Farming, and
Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 935, 935–36 (2010)
(discussing the history of agriculture law in the U.S. and arguing for a new
paradigm for the special treatment afforded agriculture under the law).
2
It should be noted that Ag-gag laws generally apply to “processing activities” and
“farming activities.” Traditionally, agricultural exceptionalism applies to the
latter, but not the former, and the distinction is not trivial. For example, the
exemptions afforded to agriculture under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a form of
agricultural exceptionalism, and the exemptions do not extend to workers in
processing. The Supreme Court has held that chicken catchers are not agricultural
workers and therefore not exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act overtime pay
provisions. See Herman v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 82 F. Supp. 2d 631 (2000). By
contrast, Ag-gag statutes attempt to expand the umbrella of agricultural
exceptionalism to also include processing activities.
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animal production facilities 3 from public scrutiny, a statesanctioned protection not afforded to other industries. 4
Early Ag-gag laws were enacted to protect agriculture
facilities from trespass and property damage, known as “agriculture
interference laws.” 5 After 2011, a second wave of Ag-gag laws
were enacted, focusing solely on information gathering activities. 6
Six states currently have Ag-gag laws which have not been
challenged in court; one state (Kansas) currently has Ag-gag
litigation pending; and in four states, Ag-gag laws have been ruled
unconstitutional. 78

3
By “animal production facility” I refer to feedlots, slaughterhouses, and livestock
processing facilities, although the term might also include animal research
facilities. For example, the Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research
Facilities Protection Act defines “animal facility” as including “any vehicle,
building, structure, research facility or premises where an animal is kept, handled,
housed, exhibited, bred or offered for sale.” KY. STAT. ANN. § 47-1826(b) (2018).
In this paper, I use the terms “animal production facility,” “animal facility,” and
“agriculture facility” to mean the same thing.
4
See generally Matthew Shea, Punishing Animal Rights Activists for Animal
Abuse: Rapid Reporting and the New Wave of Ag-Gag Laws, 48 COLUM. J. L. &
SOC. PROBS. 337 (2015) (discussing the arguments made against Ag-gag laws,
particularly the most recent generation of Ag-gag laws requiring rapid reporting to
local authorities and the damaging effects these laws have for promotion of animal
welfare).
5
Alicia Prygoski, Detailed Discussion of Ag-gag Laws, MICH. ST. U. ANIMAL
LEGAL & HIST. CTR., https://www.animallaw.info/article/detailed-discussion-aggag-laws (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
6
Id.
7
The states with Ag-gag laws in the books include Montana, North Dakota,
Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, Alabama and North Carolina. Ag-gag laws in Idaho,
Utah, Wyoming, and Iowa have been ruled unconstitutional. What is Ag-Gag
Legislation?, AM. SOC. FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS,
https://www.aspca.org/animal-protection/public-policy/what-ag-gaglegislation#Ag-Gag%20by%20State (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
8
This paper does not discuss the Wyoming Ag-gag law because it does not solely
target speech activities pertaining to animal facilities. WYO. STAT. ANN. . § 6-3-414
(2016) and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40- 27-101 (2016) were nearly identical statutes
which imposed civil and criminal penalties, respectively, for entering private land
for the purpose of collecting resource data or crossing private land to collect
resource data. WYO. STAT. ANN. §
6-3-414 (2016), invalidated by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, No. 15-CV-169SWS, 2018 WL 5318261 (D. Wyo. Oct. 29, 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-27-101
(2016), invalidated by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, No. 15-CV-169-SWS,
2018 WL 5318261 (D. Wyo. Oct. 29, 2018). In Western Watershed Project v.
Michael, the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming held that the
statutes were content-based restrictions on speech because they only penalized data
“relating to land or land use.” W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, No. 15-CV-169SWS, 2018 WL 5318261, at *8 (D. Wyo. Oct. 29, 2018) (finding that the laws
failed to meet strict scrutiny, the court deemed the laws unconstitutional).
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As recent litigation demonstrates, a state’s desire to protect
animal facilities from public scrutiny through Ag-gag legislation
frequently clashes with the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.
Despite the prominence of agricultural
exceptionalism in federal and state laws and in U.S. history, where
agricultural exceptionalism clashes with the U.S. Constitution, the
former must yield.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the constitutionality
of the Kansas Ag-gag law, “The Farm Animal and Field Crop and
Research Facilities Protection Act,” focusing on the First
Amendment. It explores the law in light of Supreme Court
jurisprudence and three recent Ag-gag cases, Animal Legal Defense
Fund v. Herbert, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, and
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds. The courts in each
respective case held the states’ Ag-gag laws unconstitutional in part
or in whole. 9
A consideration of the Kansas Ag-gag law’s
constitutionality is timely because on December 4, 2018, a coalition
of public interest groups filed suit against the state, arguing the
Kansas Ag-gag law violates the First Amendment. This article
argues that the public interest groups should succeed in its lawsuit
in part and adds additional perspective on the Kansas Ag-gag law
by addressing additional First Amendment issues with the law not
raised by the public interest group’s complaint.
Section One of this paper looks at the Kansas statute and
the complaint filed by the public interest groups. Section Two
discusses the holdings in ALDF v. Herbert, ALDF v. Wasden, and
ALDF v. Reynolds. Section Three discusses the First Amendment
problems with the Kansas law. As this article discusses below, the
Kansas law is different from the laws in Idaho, Utah, and Iowa.
Nevertheless, the two sections of the law which implicate speech
are unconstitutional and should be struck by the U.S. District Court
for the District of Kansas. 10

See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018)
(upholding and striking aspects of Idaho’s Ag-gag law); Animal Legal Def. Fund
v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1198 (D. Utah 2017) (striking Utah’s Ag-gag
law in its entirety); and Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, No.
417CV00362JEGHCA, 2019 WL 140069 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 9, 2019)(striking Iowa
Ag-gag on summary judgement).
10
See KAN. STAT. ANN. §47-1825(a) (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4)
(2018).
9
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B. Undercover Activities at Animal Facilities: Why They
Matter
The term “Ag-gag” was coined by food writer Mark
Bittman in 2011, though the history of animal activism and
undercover activity goes farther back. 11 The first animal cruelty
indictment occurred in 1999 after People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals (PETA) released footage from a three-month
investigation of animal abuse at Belcross Farm in North Carolina.12
Today, a YouTube search of “animal production undercover
investigation” yields countless undercover videos revealing horrific
animal abuse at farms, slaughterhouses, and processing facilities for
all types of animals.
These investigations matter foremost because no animal
should endure abuse. Moreover, a consumer has a right to know
how her meat arrived on her plate, and undercover investigations
can help consumers make informed decisions when purchasing
food. Also, given the expanding disconnect between consumers
and food production in our society, and the tight security at animal
facilities, these investigations may be the only source of
information disseminated to the public.
These investigations can also have serious consequences
for exposed facilities. For example, footage of graphic chicken
abuse at an egg production facility, Sparboe Farms, released by
Mercy for Animals in 2013 led McDonald’s and Target to drop the
egg supplier. 13 In a dramatic example, in 2007, the Humane
Society released footage of workers torturing cattle at Hallmark
Meat Packing Co., which raised concerns about mad cow disease
and led to a massive recall. 14 As a result, the slaughterhouse went
bankrupt.

Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011)
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/?_r=0.
12
Ted Genoways, Gagged by Big Ag: How Exposing Abuse Became a Crime,
EARTH FIRST! NEWSWIRE (June 17, 2013), http://earthfirstjournal.org/newswire/201
3/06/17/gagged-by-big-ag-how-exposing-abuse-became-a-crime/.
13
Dana Ford, McDonald’s, Target drops egg supplier after animal cruelty report,
CNN BUSINESS (Nov. 19, 2011), https://www.cnn.com/2011/11/19/business/sparbo
e-farms-animal-cruelty/index.html.
14
Wayne Pacelle, Torture on Tape, HUMANE SOC. OF THE U.S. (Jan. 3, 2008)
https://blog.humanesociety.org/2008/01/calif-cow-abuse.html?credit=blog_post_0
92509_id5103.
11
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C. State’s Fight Back: From Property Destruction to Free
Speech
As discussed above, the focus of Ag-gag laws has shifted
over time. Laws adopted in the 1990s—such as the Kansas law—
were enacted in response to groups like the Animal Liberation
Front, which engage in illegal tactics, such as fence cutting, animal
theft, and arson, to liberate animals. 15 The second wave of Ag-gag
laws, which includes the laws in Idaho, Utah, and Iowa, were
enacted in response to undercover investigations and do not
implicate physical conduct. 16
This article argues that the term “Ag-gag” applies to any
law that implicates speech activities at agriculture facilities,
including laws that mainly target trespass and physical damage. 17 A
full discussion of the evolution of these laws and the semantics of
what constitutes “Ag-gag” is beyond the scope of this article, but
merits attention in its own right.18

See Marshall Tuttle, Finally A Solution? How Animal Legal Defense Fund v.
Otter Could Affect the Constitutionality of Iowa’s Ag-Gag Law, 21 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 237, 244 (2016) (discussing the history of Ag-gag legislation in the
United States).
16
Prygoski, supra note 5.
17
See Rita-Marie Cain Reid & Amber Kingery, Putting a Gag on Farm
Whistleblowers: The Right to Lie and the Right to Remain Silent Confront
Agricultural Protectionism, 11 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 31, 35–38 (2015) (“The first
generation of ‘ag-gag’ laws . . . generally concerned trespass and harm to property
at animal facilities and properties with field crops. Additionally, however, they
criminalized unauthorized photographing or recording at the
agriculture facility…. The second wave of ag-gag enactments emphasized new
ways to chill whistleblowing and
undercover reporting.”).
18
For example, whether Ag-gag encompasses “eco-terrorism” laws is open to
discussion. See
Will Potter, Sentinel Species: the Criminalization of Animal Rights Activists as
“Terrorists,” and What It Means For Civil Liberties in Trump’s America, 95
DENV. L. REV. 887, 882–83 (2018) (discussing the history of eco-terrorism laws
and arguing that the term ‘eco-terrorism’ was created by corporate interest groups
to shift public perception regarding animal activists). See also Kevin Adam,
Shooting the Messenger: A Common-Sense Analysis of State “Ag-Gag”
Legislation Under the First Amendment, 45 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1129, 1166–67
(2012) (“The AETA has been the subject of extreme criticism, primarily because
of its disproportionately harsh penalties for conduct that falls outside of what most
would consider ‘terrorism.’ For example, six animal-rights activists—known
collectively as the ‘SHAC 7’—were convicted of conspiring to violate the AETA
and sentenced to four to six years in federal prison for operating a website that was
used to organize undercover animal-rights investigations.”).
15
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II. Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research
Facilities Protection Act
A. The Nation’s First Ag-Gag Law: Constitutionally
Suspect Sections
There are many ways for a state to draft Ag-gag legislation.
As this paper demonstrates, there are major differences in the
Idaho, Utah, Iowa, and Kansas laws, to varying degrees of
constitutionality.
The Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research
Facilities Protection Act, enacted in 1990, was the nation’s first Aggag law. 19 “Animal facility” is defined as “any vehicle, building,
structure, research facility or premises where an animal is kept,
handled, housed, exhibited, bred or offered for sale.”20
The Act broadly criminalizes four types of conduct: (1)
damaging or destroying an animal facility; (2) exercising control
over an animal facility; (3) entering an animal facility to take
pictures or recordings of the facility; and (4) remaining at an animal
facility against the owner’s wishes.21 Each prohibited act requires
that the actor have “the intent to damage or destroy” the enterprise
or the enterprise’s property. 22 Violation of the Act varies from
misdemeanor to felony depending on the amount of damage caused
to the facility. 23
Not all sections of the Kansas law are constitutionally
suspect. The sections of the law which this article argues violate
the First Amendment are the focus of this paper. First, Section (a)
“Prohibited acts; criminal penalties” is void for vagueness and
chills protected speech because it is overbroad. Section (a) states:
“No person shall, without the effective consent of the owner and
with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the animal
facility, damage or destroy an animal facility or any animal or
property in or on an animal facility.”24 However, the terms “intent
to damage” and “damage” are not defined in the statute.

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1825–47-1828 (2018).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1826(b) (2018).
21
See KAN. STAT. ANN. §47-1827(a)–(d) (2018) (providing a more detailed
description of the prohibited conduct).
22
Id.
23
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(g) (2018).
24
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(a) (2018).
19
20
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Second, Section (c) “Prohibited acts; criminal penalties” of
the statute states: “No person shall, without the effective consent of
the owner and with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at
the facility: . . . (4) enter an animal facility to take pictures by
photograph, video camera or by any other means.”25 As this article
discusses in detail below, this section violates the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. Before addressing these sections
and comparing them with the constitutional issues addressed by the
Ninth Circuit, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, and
the U.S. District Court for the District of Iowa, this article discusses
the recent complaint filed against the State of Kansas.
B. Animal Legal Defense Fund Files Suit
i. The Complaint
On December 5, 2018, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Center
for Food Safety, Shy 38 Inc., and Hope Sanctuary filed suit against
the Kansas Governor and State Attorney General, alleging that the
Kansas Farm and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protection Act
violates the First Amendment. 26 The complaint alleges (1) that the
law is an impermissible content and viewpoint-based restriction on
protected speech; 27 and (2) that the law is overbroad. 28
First, Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) alleges that the
Act violates the First Amendment because it regulates speech based
on the speaker’s message, which is a content-based restriction on
protected speech. 29 When the Farm Animal and Field Crop and
Research Facilities Protection Act was enacted, the state already
had content-neutral statutes prohibiting fraud, trespass, adulteration
of food products, theft, theft of trade secrets, and destruction of
property. 30 Because the state has created a separate law to prosecute
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c) (2018).
Complaint at 1, 6, ALDF v. Colyer, No. 2:18-cv-02657-KHV-JPO (D. Kan.
Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/KSAg-Gag.pdf.
27
Id. at 28–30.
28
Id. at 30–31.
29
See id. at 28–29 (citing Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96
(1972), holding that “laws which
target certain messages or speech because of their ‘ideas, subject matter, or
content’” violate the First Amendment,
and arguing that this designation of content-based restrictions applies to the Kansas
Ag-Gag law).
30
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5808 (2018) (creating and describing the state crime
of criminal trespass); KAN. STAT. ANN. 65-664 (2018) (describing the conditions
25
26
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certain conduct and speech at animal production facilities, ALDF
argues the law distinguishes favored speech from disfavored speech
on the basis of ideas or viewpoints. 31 The complaint alleges that
“the law applies only to speech that involves the subject matter of
the animal industry and its practices and is therefore content-based
on its face.” 32
As the complaint notes, content-based restrictions regarding
speech are subject to strict scrutiny. 33 ALDF argues the law is
neither justified by a compelling interest, nor narrowly tailored to
protecting privacy, trespass, and biosecurity because the state can
do so through less restrictive means. 34
ALDF’s second cause of action is that the law’s
overbreadth amounts to a restriction on protected speech. 35 ALDF
also argues that the law has a chilling effect on speech because the
text is vague, and violations carry a heavy criminal penalty.36
Specifically, because the law does not define the meaning of “intent
to damage,” it is unclear what type of conduct is prohibited.37
Moreover, the “almost limitless” definition of animal facility 38 and
research facility 39 chills speech because the statute covers an
expansive number of forums: the complaint notes, “these broad
definitions would include not just factory farms . . . but also . . .
under which a food will be deemed adulterated); KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-5801 (2018
(describing the crime of theft)); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-3320 (2018); KAN. STAT.
ANN. 21-5813 (2018) (describing the crime of criminal damage to property).
31
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (explaining that
regulations which differentiate speech on the basis of content are subject to
exacting scrutiny, while regulations unrelated to the content of speech are subject
to intermediate scrutiny).
32
Complaint, supra note 26, at 28–29.
33
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 643 (holding content-based restrictions
are subject to strict scrutiny).
34
Complaint, supra note 26, at 29.
35
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (holding that a law
prohibiting substantially more speech than necessary is unconstitutional even
though some of the conduct targeted by the law does not offend the First
Amendment).
36
Complaint, supra note 26, at 17–19.
37
Complaint, supra note 26, at 13–14.
38
Defined as “any vehicle, building, structure, research facility or premises where
an animal is kept, handled, housed, exhibited, bred or offered for sale. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 47-1826(b) (2012).
39
Defined as “any place, laboratory, institution, medical care facility, elementary
school, secondary school, college or university, at which any scientific test,
experiment or investigation involving the use of any living animal or field crop
product is carried out, conducted or attempted.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47‒1826(i)
(2012).
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restaurants with lobster or fish tanks, pet stores, circuses, petting
zoos, and elementary school classrooms with an ant farm . . . ”40
The chilling effect of the law’s vagueness and broad sweep
is compounded by the potential for criminal prosecution at the
felony level. ALDF indicates that “the criminal penalties are the
same for a person who intends to take a picture in an animal facility
without the consent of the owner as for a person who knowingly
kills or injures an animal.” 41
ii. Assessment of Complaint
This article agrees with ALDF’s claims for relief—that the
law violates the First Amendment as a content and viewpoint-based
discrimination, and second, that the law’s overbreadth violates the
First Amendment—while diverging from the argument that the
entire statute is unconstitutional.
As a content and view-point based discrimination, this
article relies heavily on Reed v. Town of Gilbert, discussed in detail
below. 42 While ALDF’s complaint does not cite Reed, reference to
this important case regarding facially content-neutral laws would
strengthen its case.
Regarding the statute’s overbreadth, ALDF focuses on the
wide range of conduct prohibited by the law, alleging that the entire
law is unconstitutional because “the law as a whole restricts
substantially more speech than the First Amendment permits.”43
This article diverges from ALDF in this allegation, because certain
prohibited activities in the statute do not implicate speech.
For example, K.S.A. § 47-1827(b) prohibits “acquir[ing] or
otherwise exercis[ing] control over an animal facility . . .” and
K.S.A. §§ 47-1827(e) and (f) prohibit “dama[ing] or [destroy]ing . .
. field crops” at a private research facility or a government agency.
The conduct prohibited in these sections does not implicate
the First Amendment, and, despite the statute’s overbreadth and
vagueness, there is a significant difference between causing
Complaint, supra note 26, at 20.
Id. at 18 (comparing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(g)(3) (2006) with KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21- 6412(b)(2)(A) (2017)).
42
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2227 (2015).
43
Complaint, supra note 26, at 30–31 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460, 473 (2010)).
40
41
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physical damage to a facility versus making an undercover
recording. While the statute amounts to an unreasonable restraint
on protected speech, damaging or destroying another’s property is
not protected speech. Thus, the Kansas District Court could find
the sections of the statute which implicate speech unconstitutional
while upholding the sections of the statute targeting conduct. 44
iii. Comparison to Idaho, Utah, and Iowa Ag-Gag Laws
This section discusses the opinions in the Idaho, Utah, and
Iowa cases. Notably, these three Ag-gag statutes all targeted some
form of false speech used to obtain entry, access, or employment at
an agriculture facility. By contrast, the Kansas statute does not
address false speech. Thus, while the courts in these respective
cases all apply the Supreme Court’s test for laws regulating false
speech, this inquiry is not relevant in the Kansas case. 45
The Idaho statute was deemed unconstitutional in part,
while the Utah and Iowa statutes were deemed unconstitutional
entirely. While the Kansas statute does not address false speech, it
is still at least in-part unconstitutional.
C. ALDF v. Wasden: Idaho Ag-Gag Held Partially
Unconstitutional
The Idaho Interference with Agricultural Production law
was passed in 2014 after an undercover video of abuse at an Idaho
dairy was released. 46 Shortly after the law was enacted, ALDF
filed suit. The case was eventually appealed to the Ninth Circuit,
and a decision was released in January 2018.

A discussion of conduct under the First Amendment is beyond the scope of this
paper, though it should be noted that damaging or destroying an animal facility
would be not considered expressive conduct. See United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968) (discussing the limits and considerations involved when
considering restrictions on symbolic speech).
45
See U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that false speech which
neither causes a legally cognizable harm nor inures a material gain to the speaker
is a form of protected speech).
46
Arin Greenwood, Court Says No to Gagging Those Who Reveal Farm Animal
Abuse, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/id
aho-ag-gag-law_us_55c0b399e4b06363d5a35543; Mercy for Animals, Burger
King Cruelty—Video Exposes Horrific Animal Abuse at a Burger King Dairy
Supplier, YOUTUBE (Oct. 9, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNYcWOu
Vqk& oref=https% 3A% 2F% 2Fwww.youtube.com% 2Fwatch% 3Fv% 3DlN
YcWOuVqk& has verified1.
44
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In ALDF v. Wasden, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held two sections of Idaho’s Interference with Agricultural
Production law unconstitutional.
First, Section (1)(a), the
“Misrepresentation Clause,” stated: “a person commits the crime of
interference with agricultural production if the person knowingly:
(a) is not employed by an agricultural production facility and enters
an agricultural facility by force, threat, misrepresentation or
trespass.” 47
Second, Section (1)(d), the “Recording Clause,” prohibited
“enter[ing] an agricultural production facility that is not open to the
public and, without the facility owner’s express consent . . .
mak[ing] an audio or video recording of the conduct of an
agricultural production facility’s operation.” 48 The remainder of
Section A focuses on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.
i. Misrepresentation Clause
1. Gaining Entry Through Misrepresentation is Protected
Speech
Assessing the constitutionality of the Misrepresentation
Clause, the Ninth Circuit looked to U.S. v. Alvarez, in which the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Stolen Valor Act, which
criminalized false claims that the speaker had received the
Congressional Medal of Honor. 49 In Alvarez, the Court held that
false speech is neither categorically protected nor unprotected; false
speech made for the purpose of material gain, material advantage,
or that inflicts a legally cognizable harm can be criminalized.50
Other forms of false speech, which do not fall into any of the
unprotected categories, receive constitutional protection. 51
The Ninth Circuit held that criminalizing entering an
agricultural production facility by misrepresentation violated
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(c) (2018).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(d) (2018).
49
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 709.
50
Id. at 712.
51
Cf. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1195 (2018). It
should be noted that Alvarez was a plurality decision, and there has been
discussion in lower courts as to whether the plurality’s opinion applies, or the
concurrence’s (Breyer, J. concurring, applying a form of intermediate scrutiny to
protected false speech). While considering the narrow grounds of the Alvarez
majority, the Ninth Circuit and the District Courts for Utah and Iowa all applied
strict scrutiny.
47
48
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Alvarez. The court reasoned that “lying to gain entry merely allows
the speaker to cross the threshold of another’s property, including
public property.” 52 Lying for this purpose does not necessarily
result in material gain or advantage for the speaker, nor does it
inflict a legally cognizable harm on the property owner. 53
Because lying to gain entry is protected speech under
Alvarez, the court assessed Section(1)(a) under strict scrutiny. The
court held that the state might have a compelling interest in
regulating property rights and protecting its farm industry, but
“criminalizing access to property by misrepresentation is not
actually necessary to protect those rights . . . If . . . [the state’s] real
concern is trespass, then Idaho already has a prohibition against
trespass that does not implicate speech in any way.”54
2. Obtaining Records Through Misrepresentation is
Unprotected Speech
Conversely, Section (1)(b), which prohibits “obtain[ing]
records of an agricultural production facility by force, threat,
misrepresentation or trespass” 55 and Section (1)(c), which prohibits
“obtain[ing] employment with an agricultural facility by force,
threat, or misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or
other injury to the facility’s operations, livestock, crops, owners,
personnel, equipment, buildings, premises, business interests or
customers” 56 were upheld.
The court held that making false statements to obtain
records inflicts a property harm upon the owner and could result in
material gain to the speaker and is thus unprotected speech under
Alvarez. 57 For example, a property owner suffers a legally
cognizable harm from records obtained through false speech and

Id. at 1195.
See id. at 1194–95 (exemplifying this point, the court makes the following
analogy: “Take, for example, a teenager who wants to impress his friends by
obtaining a highly sought-after reservation at an exclusive pop-up restaurant that is
open to the public. If he were to call the restaurant and finagle a reservation in the
name of his mother, a well-known journalist, that would be a misrepresentation. If
the restaurant offers up a reservation on the basis of the mother’s notoriety,
granting a “license” to enter the premises…the teenager would be subject to
punishment of up to one year in prison, a fine not to exceed $5,000 or both.”).
54
Id. at 1196.
55
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(b) (2018).
56
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(c) (2018).
57
Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1199.
52
53
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the speaker may learn trade secrets. Because such speech is
unprotected, it is only subject to rational review.
Regarding the Equal Protection Clause, the Ninth Circuit
did acknowledge that the law was partially motivated by animus
towards animal welfare groups. 58 However, because animal
welfare groups are not a traditionally suspect class, a court may
only strike the statute “if [it] serves no legitimate government
purpose and if impermissible animus towards an unpopular group
prompted the statute’s enactment.”59 The court acknowledged that
animus towards reporters and activists was a factor in passing the
statute, but that it also serves the legitimate purpose of protecting
agricultural production facilities from interference. 60
3. Obtaining Employment Through Misrepresentation is
Unprotected Speech
The Ninth Circuit also held that Section (1)(c), which
prohibits obtaining employment through misrepresentation with the
intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility, does not
offend Alvarez. In Alvarez, the Supreme Court stated, “[w]here
false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or valuable
considerations, say offers of employment, it is well established that
the Government may restrict speech without affronting the First
Amendment.”61 Moreover, this section is limited to those seeking
employment with intent to cause economic or other injury to the
facility, which further narrows its scope.
While this speech is unprotected, in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, the Supreme Court held that the government may offend the
First Amendment if it makes a viewpoint distinction in regulating
unprotected speech. 62 ALDF argued that the statute’s Restitution
Clause, which permits victims to recover twice the amount of the
damage resulting from the statute’s violation, violated R.A.V.
See id. at 1200–01 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 448 (1985), holding “a bare…desire to harm a politically unpopular group
[or] negative attitude[s] or fears about that group [do not constitute] a legitimate
government interest for the purpose of this review.”).
59
Id. at 1200 (citing Mountain Water Co. v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation,
919 F.2d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 1990)).
60
Id. at 1201.
61
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723.
62
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (distinguishing which
types of features of speech can be prohibited without violating the First
Amendment).
58
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because it was enacted solely to punish whistleblowers and
journalists, and thus suppress a specific viewpoint. 63 The Ninth
Circuit held that because the Restitution Clause is limited to
economic loss, rather than “less tangible damage” such as
emotional distress, the statute does not punish animal activists any
more so than other regulations in the Idaho Penal code. 64
ii. Recording Clause
The Recording Clause created the crime of interference
with agricultural production if a person knowingly “[e]nters an
agricultural production facility that is not open to the public and,
without the facility owner’s express consent or pursuant to judicial
process or statutory authorization, makes audio or video recordings
of the conduct of an agricultural production facility’s operation.” 65
The Ninth Circuit held that the Recording Clause violated
the First Amendment. As a preliminary matter, the court indicated
that making an audio or video recording is speech protected by the
First Amendment. 66 The court then determined the Recording
Clause was a content-based restriction because law enforcement
would be required to view the content of the recording to determine
before bringing charges. Because the Recording Clause was
deemed to be a content-based restriction, the court assessed it under
strict scrutiny. The court held that the clause was not narrowly
tailored to protect agriculture production facilities because it was
both over and under-inclusive. The clause was held to be underinclusive because it did not regulate photographs and over-inclusive
because it suppressed more speech than necessary to protect
property and privacy. 67
D. ALDF v. Herbert: Utah Ag-Gag Held Unconstitutional
In 2012, the State of Utah enacted the Agricultural
Operation Interference law, which created the crime of agricultural
interference for certain recording activities; seeking access to an
agriculture operation under false pretenses; and seeking
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(4) (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5304 (2018);
Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1202.
64
Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1202
65
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1), (2) (2018).
66
Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1203 (stating “[N]either the Supreme Court nor [the Ninth
Circuit] has ever drawn a distinction between the process of creating a form of
pure speech (such as writing or painting) and the product of these processes (the
essay or artwork) in terms of First Amendment protection afforded…” 1203.
67
Id. at 1204.
63
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employment with the intent to record activities at an agriculture
production facility. The United States District Court for the District
of Utah held the entire statute unconstitutional, and the State of
Utah did not file an appeal.
i. Lying Provision: Unconstitutional Restriction on
Protected Speech
Section (2)(b) created the crime of agricultural operation
interference if a person “obtains access to an agricultural operation
under false pretenses.” 68 The court assessed this section under the
Alvarez standard discussed above. The Utah District Court, like the
Ninth Circuit in Wasden, held that Section (2)(b) infringed on
protected speech, noting “[l]ying to gain entry, without more, does
not itself constitute trespass.”69 Thus, because obtaining access
through false pretenses does not necessarily result in a legally
cognizable harm, it does not fall into a category of unprotected false
speech under Alvarez. The court cited numerous examples of
speech which could be criminalized under this provision, such as a
restaurant critic who hides her identity, a dinner guest who lies to
his host, and a job applicant who fabricates his hobbies. 70
Because Section (2)(b) infringed on protected speech, it
was assessed under strict scrutiny. The state cited four interests
before the court: 1) protecting animals from injury resulting from
unqualified workers; 2) protecting animals from disease brought
into the facility by workers; 3) protecting workers from exposure to
disease; and 4) protecting workers from injury resulting from
unqualified workers. 71
The court held that even if these were compelling interests,
the statute was not narrowly tailored to address these problems.
The lying provision was over-inclusive in that it criminalized
conduct unrelated to protecting these interests, and under-inclusive
in that it did nothing to target harmful conduct resulting from
“anyone other than an undercover investigator.” 72

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76–6–112.
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1203 (D. Utah 2017).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1211.
72
Id. at 1213.
68
69
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ii. Recording Provision: Unconstitutional Restriction on
Protected Speech
Section (2)(a), (c), and (d) created the crime of agricultural
operation interference for various recording activities at an
agricultural production facility.73 As a preliminary matter, the court
held that recordings were a form of speech for First Amendment
purposes. 74 The state argued that because the Act only applied to
speech on private property, First Amendment protections did not
apply. The court rejected this argument, stating “a landowner’s
ability to exclude from her property someone who wishes to speak,
and the government’s ability to jail the person for that speech” are
two different concepts which the state incorrectly conflated. 75
The court then determined that the recording provisions
were a content restriction because they required viewing the content
of the recordings to determine if they were recordings of an
agriculture operation. Had the statute supplanted the term “of” with
“at” the court indicated it might have assessed the provisions as
content-neutral restrictions.”76
As a content-based restriction, the court assessed the
recording provision under strict scrutiny. The court held that the
state offered no clear evidence of how its interests in enacting the
statute, discussed above, were furthered by recording restrictions.
The recording provisions, like the lying provisions, were deemed
unconstitutional.
E. ALDF v. Reynolds: Iowa Ag-Gag Held Unconstitutional
Most recently, in January 2019, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Iowa held the state’s “Agricultural production
facility fraud” statute unconstitutional in a summary judgement
motion. 77 The Iowa law, enacted in 2012, created the crime of
agricultural production facility fraud for “(a). obtain[ing] access to
an agricultural production facility by false pretenses” and “(b).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 76–6–112(2)(a), (c), (d).
Herbert, 263 F. Supp. at 1208 (stating that, “[b]ecause recordings themselves are
protected by the First Amendment, so too must the making of those recordings be
protected. This is not to say that the State cannot regulate the act of recording; it is
merely to say that if it wishes to do so, the State must justify and narrowly tailor
the restriction, as with any other constraint on speech.”).
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1211.
77
IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A; Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 2019 WL
140069 (S.D. Iowa 2019).
73
74
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mak[ing] a false statement or representation as part of an
application or agreement to be employed at an agricultural
production facility, if the person knows the statement to be false,
and mak[ing] the statement with the intent to commit an act not
authorized by the owner . . . ” 78 For a first conviction, the crime
constituted a serious misdemeanor and for a subsequent conviction,
the crime constituted an aggravated misdemeanor.79
i. False Speech and Employment: A Different Outcome
Than Wasden
As a preliminary matter, the Iowa District Court determined
that the false speech at issue—both making false statements to
access an agriculture facility and making false statements to seek
employment at an agriculture facility—are protected forms of
speech under Alvarez because neither instance causes a legally
cognizable harm nor provides a material gain to the speaker. 80
Interestingly, the Iowa District Court came to a different conclusion
regarding false speech and employment than the Ninth Circuit,
which upheld Idaho’s restriction on obtaining employment at an
agriculture facility through false speech.
Unlike the Idaho statute, which prohibited obtaining
“employment . . . by force, threat, or misrepresentation with the
intent to cause economic or other injury,”81 the Iowa statute
prohibits obtaining employment by false speech “with the intent to
commit an act not authorized by the owner.”82 In a previous
decision addressing the state’s motion to dismiss, the Iowa court
held that the Ninth Circuit’s holding regarding Idaho’s employment
clause was inapplicable because the court “placed great emphasis
on the intent prong of the Idaho statute.”83
The Iowa court reasoned that “[t]his intent provision
cabined the application of the Idaho statute so that it only
criminalized the sort of false statements that the plurality in
[Alvarez] recognized the government may target . . . : those likely
to cause material harm to others.”84 Conversely, the Iowa code
IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1)(a),(b) (2012).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(2)(a),(b) (2012).
80
Reynolds, 2019 WL at 10.
81
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(c) (2018).
82
IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(b) (2012).
83
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 297 F. Supp. 3d 901, 924 (S.D. Iowa
2018).
84
Id.
78
79
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prohibits all false speech in a job application if the speaker intends
to commit an unauthorized act—a much broader prohibition that
the Idaho code. Determining section § 717A.3A(b) to be broader
than the type of false speech the Court deemed unprotected in
Alvarez, the Iowa court assessed section (b) under strict scrutiny.
ii. Iowa Statute Does Not Survive Strict Scrutiny
In the court’s summary judgment opinion, it deemed §
717A.3A unconstitutional. First, the court determined the entire
statute was a content-based restriction because the content of the
speech—whether it was true or false—would need to be assessed to
find an individual guilty of agriculture production facility fraud. 85
As a content-based restriction, the court applied strict
scrutiny in assessing the law. 86 Though dubious of the state’s
justifications for the law (property interests and biosecurity) it still
held that these interests were important, but not compelling. 87 The
law was also deemed unnecessary to protect these interests because
the state made no argument explaining how false speech used to
access or gain employment at an agriculture facility would
compromise biosecurity. 88 Finally, the court determined that
because Iowa already has other content-neutral statutes regarding
trespass and biosecurity, the state’s interests could be achieved by
means which do not affront protected speech. 89 As of February 14,
2019, the Iowa Attorney General’s Office is set to file an appeal
brief by March 20, 2019. 90
III. Kansas Ag-Gag: ‘Better’ Drafted, But Partially
Unconstitutional
As the nation’s first Ag-gag law, perhaps there is a reason
the Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities

85
Reynolds, 2019 WL at 11 (citing See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.,
468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984) (holding law that prohibits broadcasting stations which
receive federal funds from editorializing is content-based.)).
86
Id. at 6.
87
Id. at 7.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 8.
90
Rox Laird, Federal Judge Strikes Down Iowa ‘Ag-Gag’ Law, https://www.court
housenews.com/federal-judge-strikes-down-iowa-ag-gag-law/, (last visited Jan. 21,
2019); see also Challenging Iowa’s Ag-Gag Law, Animal Legal Defense Fund
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://aldf.org/case/challenging-iowas-ag-gag-law/ (last visited
March 4, 2019).
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Protection Act was not challenged until 2018; it is ‘better’ drafted
than the Idaho and Utah laws. 91
Notably, there is no section in the Kansas statute which
criminalizes false speech used to enter or seek employment at an
animal facility, so Alvarez is not relevant. However, like the Idaho
and Utah statutes, the Kansas statute does criminalize conduct
involving recording and photography.
Despite its tactful drafting, certain sections are still
constitutionally suspect. 92 This section assesses these problematic
sections of the law in light of the holdings in Reynolds, Wasden,
and Herbert.
A. Unconstitutional Aspects of Kansas Law
i.

Because Key Terms are Not Defined, the Statute is
Overbroad and Vague

1. The Meddling Student Example 93
The word ‘damage’ and the clause ‘intent to damage’ are
not defined in the statute’s definition section. However, each
prohibited act under § 47-1827 requires the actor have the ‘intent to
damage’ the enterprise. 94 Because the term ‘damage’ and the
clause ‘intent to damage’ are not defined in statute’s definitions
section, the statute chills speech and restricts more speech than
necessary to serve its purpose. If the term ‘damage’ were defined
to only include activities resulting in physical damage, the
remainder of the statute (excluding § 47-1827(c)(4)) might be
constitutional.
The Supreme Court has stated, “a law may be invalidated
as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are
It should also be noted that no one has ever been prosecuted under this law.
See Complaint, supra note 26, at 31 (alleging that the entire statute is
unconstitutional on its face or, in the alternative, that Kan. Stat. § 47-1827(c)(4),
(c)(1), (c)(3), Kan. Stat. § 47-1827(a), (b), (c)(2), and (d)(1) are unconstitutional as
applied to Plaintiff.) For purposes of this paper, I only argue that Sections Kan.
Stat. § 47-1827(a) and (c)(4) are unconstitutional.
93
This example was inspired by the Ninth Circuit’s factious teenager who lies
about his identity in order to secure a reservation at an exclusive restaurant, thus
implicating Idaho Code § 18–7042(1)(a). See Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1195.
94
§ 47-1827(b) is the only prohibited act with a different standard, requiring the
actor have the “intent to deprive the owner of such facility.”
91
92
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unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly
legitimate sweep.” 95 Even if aspects of the law are constitutional,
under the overbreadth doctrine, the court considers that “the threat
of enforcement of an overbroad law [will] dete[r] people from
engaging in constitutionally protected speech.” 96
In this instance, the word ‘damage’ and the term ‘intent to
damage’ could mean many things and runs the risk of criminalizing
perfectly legitimate forms of speech. For example, does the statute
criminalize economic, emotional, or physical damage, or all three?
There is also a timing issue: must the speaker have the
intent to damage the enterprise before she engages in her speech
activity, or can she be charged if her intent changes from the time
she made a recording or photograph to the time of disseminating
the information?
To exemplify the statute’s overbreadth, consider the
following hypothetical activity which could be criminalized under
the statute. A school group offers a tour to a local animal
production facility as part of a field trip for a science class. Though
the students are told in advance not to take any photos inside, a
student nonetheless hides his phone in his pocket before the field
trip because he plans to take a photo, just for fun. The student has
signed up for the field trip because his friends dared him to take a
photo inside.
Once inside, he takes a particularly gruesome photo of an
animal carcass being processed. The student entered the facility an
omnivore, but, when he returns home and views the photo, he
realizes he is disgusted by the facility and becomes a vegetarian.
Wanting to share his news and hoping to persuade others in his
network to stop eating meat, he posts the photo to his Facebook
page, and in the caption, he names the animal production facility
and tells his friends that they should stop eating meat because of the
atrocities he witnessed at the facility. A few of his friends view the
photo, are also disgusted by it, and decide to stop eating meat.
Under Section (c)(4), the student could be criminally
prosecuted. By captioning the facility’s name in his photo and
hoping to convert his friends to vegetarianism, the student had the
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
449 n.6 (2008) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615).
96
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2018).
95
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“intent to damage the enterprise.” Because he planned to take the
photo in advance of entering the facility, he entered “to take
pictures.” For his actions, the student could be fined and charged
with a misdemeanor or felony, depending on the extent of his
damage. Whether the facility owner might have recourse in a
private tort action (which is beyond the scope of this paper), the
State cannot lawfully criminalize such conduct without infringing
on First Amendment rights.97
2. Kansas Attorney General Opinion Letter Does Not
Ameliorate Statute’s Issues
Following the statute’s enactment, the Kansas Attorney
General released Opinion Letter No. 90-72 on the issue of the
meaning of “intent to damage.” 98 The letter does little to clarify
any confusion surrounding the statue’s vagueness and overbreadth,
and moreover, the letter is not binding law. 99
The letter states that the specific intent to damage the
enterprise conducted at the facility is a required element of the
crime, and such intent is determined by a judge or jury based on the
totality of circumstances surrounding the event.
Responding to the question of what “damages” means, the
Opinion Letter essentially ‘punts’ on the issue. The most definitive
statement in the letter says, “[u]pon conviction, restitution may be
ordered in an amount sufficient to compensate the victim for the
loss suffered. In a civil action compensatory damages may include
out-of-pocket loss as well as consequential damages.” 100 So, if
damages constitute any form of quantifiable harm, perhaps any
intent is sufficient to implicate charges so long as the victim’s
losses are quantifiable. This logic is purely speculative and does
little to clarify the meaning of ‘intent to damage.’
Note that the State of Utah argued that the First Amendment was inapplicable to
its Ag-gag statute because the law only regulated speech on private property. The
Utah District Court was quick to reject this argument, noting that the state had
conflated the difference between “a landowner’s ability to exclude from her
property someone who wishes to speak, and the government’s ability to jail the
person for that speech.” The former does not affront the First Amendment, while
the latter does. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. at 1208.
98
See Livestock and Domestic Animals -- Farm Animal and Research Facilities
Protection Act -- 1990 Senate Bill No. 776 Op. Kan. Att’y Gen. No. 90-72 (1990),
http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/1990/1990-072.pdf (last visited Ma. 10,
2019).
99
Id.
100
Id. at 10.
97
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i. The Pictures Clause Fails First Amendment Scrutiny as
Either Content-Based or Content-Neutral Restriction
Section (c) of Prohibited acts; criminal penalties states:
“[n]o person shall, without the effective consent of the owner and
with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the animal
facility . . . (4) enter an animal facility to take pictures by
photograph, video camera or by other means.”101 This section
infringes on protected speech in violation of the First Amendment
as either a content-based or content-neutral restriction on speech. 102
The first step in assessing this section under the First
Amendment is to determine if it infringes on protected speech. The
Supreme Court has held movies to be protected by the First
Amendment. 103 And in United States v. Stevens, the Court stated
“visual [and] auditory depiction[s], such as photographs, videos, or
sound recordings” are subject to the First Amendment. 104 It
logically follows that the act of creating a film, photo, or recording
must receive some level of protection as well, and neither the Ninth
Circuit, the Utah District Court, nor the Iowa District Court
considered otherwise. Thus, protected speech is at issue.
1. Assessed as Content-Neutral Restriction
Section (c)(4) prohibits entering an animal facility “to take
pictures by photograph, video camera, or by other means.” 105 This
section is notably different from both the Idaho and Utah statutes in
that it does not prohibit taking pictures or recordings of an
agriculture production facility, but rather at an animal production
facility. 106
Because this section limits where a photo or recording can
be made, rather than regulating the photo or videos content, it might
be deemed a content-neutral regulation. In Herbert, responding to
the state’s argument that the recording provision was a contentneutral restriction, the Utah District Court stated, “[t]hat might be
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (2018).
There is also a timing issue here, as discussed above in the meddling student
example. Must the actor have the intent to damage the enterprise before she enters?
This uncertainty contributes to the statute’s overbreadth and vagueness.
103
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
104
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010).
105
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (2018).
106
Id.
101
102
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so if the Act criminalized recording an imagine at an agricultural
operation. But the Act criminalizes recording an image of an
agricultural operation. The distinction is not trivial . . . the use of
“of” rather than “at” means the Act does not bar all filming at an
agricultural operation, so it is not location based.”107
Following the rationale of the Utah District Court, the
Kansas recording provision should be assessed as a content-neutral
restriction. Though there are different variations of the contentneutral test, the Supreme Court commonly asks if the law “is
designed to serve a substantial government interest and [does] not
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.” 108
Even assuming the Kansas legislature has a substantial
interest in protecting its farmers and ranchers, it is dubious that the
law does not ‘unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication.’
Individuals and groups who wish to disseminate
information and exposés of animal production facilities essentially
have no other avenue of communication under this law. The
hypothetical “alternative avenues of communication” do not
measure up to the prohibited conduct. For example, an individual
could seek the owner’s consent to film or photograph, but clearly
what the individual would see while undercover at a facility would
be different than what the individual would see during a planned
visit.
And given the tight security at animal production facilities,
there is essentially no way to take photos or recordings from the
outside. Alternatively, an entity or individual wishing to expose
abuses at an animal production facility could interview a willing
employee, but the differences between reading an interview versus
viewing images or audio recordings is significant. A business can
prohibit individuals from recording or taking photos on its property,
but the state cannot lawfully criminalize such conduct. Because the
Herbert, 263 F. Supp. at 1211.
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 41 (1986). See also
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453
U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consc., 452 U.S. 640, 64748 (1981) (illustrating that the Court commonly asks whether a law regarding
speech is designed to serve a substantial government interest and does not limit
alternate avenues of communication).
107
108
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law limits the only legitimate avenue for this speech to occur, it
infringes on protected speech if it is deemed content-neutral.
2. Assessed as Content-Based Restriction
Despite the text of Section (c)(4), and the distinction drawn
by the Utah District Court between the term “at” and “of,” it is not
clear if the Kansas recording provision is actually content-neutral.
Arguably, Section (c)(4) is content-based.
In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Supreme Court stated, “our
precedents have . . . recognized a separate and additional category
of laws that, though facially content-neutral, will be considered
content-based regulations of speech: laws that cannot be justified
without reference to the content of the regulation of speech or that
were adopted by the government because of disagreement with the
message [the speech] conveys. Those laws, like those that are
content-based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny.”109
The Kansas statute is content-based under the Gilbert logic.
First, the law cannot be justified without reference to its content.
For example, although the law prohibits recordings and taking
photos at an animal production facility, it only singles out those
made with the intent to damage the enterprise. Viewing the
contents of the photo or recording is important, if not necessary, to
determine the actor’s intent. For example, a photograph of a sunset
taken at an animal production facility is probably not taken with the
intent to damage the enterprise. But a photograph of animal abuse
is likely taken to expose the conduct and cause the enterprise
economic damage. Thus, Section (c)(4) cannot be justified without
viewing the content of the photo or recording.
Second, the law regulates the content of speech because the
government disagrees with the speaker. In Gilbert, the Court further
stated, “government regulation of speech is content-based if a law
applies to a particular speech because of the topic discussed or the
idea or message expressed.” In this instance, the state already has
other laws on its books which protect privacy, trespass, and
biosecurity. 110 Why the state should need an additional law
singling out speech at an agriculture production facility is unclear

109
110

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
Complaint, supra note 26, at 29.
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and is only justified by a desire to suppress speech on the topic of
animal welfare. 111
Because Section (c)(4) is content-based under the
“additional category” of laws recognized in Gilbert, it will only be
upheld if it meets strict scrutiny, a standard most laws infringing on
protected speech are unable to meet.
Under strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest. While the state may have a
compelling interest in protecting its agriculture production
facilities, the law is not narrowly tailored to this interest because, as
mentioned above, other laws are already on the books in Kansas
that protect these interests and do not infringe on speech. Under
strict scrutiny, this section fails.
IV. Conclusion
The outcome of four prior cases striking Ag-gag legislation
indicates an ominous fate for the Kansas Farm Animal and Field
Crop and Research Facilities Protection Act. While the statute’s
Picture’s Clause uses different language from the Pictures Clauses
in Idaho and Utah respectively, it too fails to meet the demands of
strict scrutiny for the reasons discussed above. Moreover, the
vague meaning of ‘damage’ and ‘intent to damage’ creates an issue
of overbreadth.
While the entire Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research
Facilities Protection Act might not violate the First Amendment,
whether these laws are good public policy is an entirely separate
question. The State of Kansas and the remaining six states with Aggag laws might rationalize these laws with trespass or property
damage concerns, but there is no rational justification to suppress
speech in the process. Ag-gag laws are yet another example of
legislation which affords agriculture special status.
While
agricultural exceptionalism’s pervasiveness in U.S. history and law
is unlikely to shift in the immediate future, it must always yield to
the First Amendment.

Even if the state has a compelling interest in protecting the property of animal
facilities from physical damage—and it is not even clear this was the state’s real
interest in enacting the law—prohibiting recording and photography is not
necessary to further this interest.
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